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Philosophy 3

The Nature of Mind

Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy of Mind

 Bence Nanay

Summer 2005

  

Paper topics

 

Final paper:

 

The final paper will be due on Friday the 1st.

Answer one of the following questions (you can choose which one).

 

1. In what sense is Dretske's theory of content externalist? How does his kind of externalism relate to Putnam's version? Which one do you find more persuasive?

 

2. The director of British Telecom, one of the most famous IT gurus, made a stir a month ago when he claimed that in a couple of decades we will have the technological tools that would allow us to change bodies (by uploading our mind and then downloading it to our new body). What are the philosophical implications of this view (ignoring issues about personal identity)? Is it compatible with token identity theory? Is it compatible with type identity theory? With any of the three versions of functionalism? Also, what does it say about consciousness?

 

3. Dretske claims (in another article "The Intentionality of Cognitive States") that "the distinctive character of our cognitive states lies, not in their intentionality (for even the humble thermometer occupies intentional states), but in their degree of intentionality". This sounds very similar to Dennett's conclusion. Compare and contrast Dretske's and Dennett's account of intentional states. In doing so, address the question whether and in what sense would these two accounts count as naturalistic.

 

4. Functionalism is a theory about mental states in general. Given that intentional states (beliefs, desires, etc.) are also mental states, functionalism may have some implications for the problem of the intentionality of mind. What implications does functionalism have for theories of mental content? In particular, does it imply internalism? Is it consistent with externalism? Does it imply naturalism (about content)? If functionalism is right, can content be indeterminate?

  

The required length of the paper is FOUR pages (double spaced).

You may want to take a look at my guidelines for writing a philosophy paper, which is posted on the Lecture Notes and Handouts website.

 

Second paper:

 

The second paper will be due on Monday the 20th before class (at 2pm).

Answer one of the following questions (you can choose which one this time).

 

1. Do thermostats have beliefs? What does Dennett say? How can one interpret his claim in such a way that does not sound completely crazy? Assess his argument critically.

 

2. Describe three counterexamples to Grice's analysis of speaker meaning. For each one, say whether it is directed at the necessity or the sufficiency of Grice's conditions, and say how Grice's account might be modified to block the counterexample. Which counterexamples are the most difficult for a Gricean to handle?

 

3. "This means war!" Is 'means' used in a natural or non-natural sense here? Why? What is the exact difference between natural and non-natural meaning? Which one of the two can allow for the possibility of misrepresentation?

 

4. What is the Chinese Room Argument supposed to show? What is the Symbol Grounding Problem supposed to show? What is the logical relation between the two? Which one is the better argument according to you?

 

 

The required length of the paper is two pages (double spaced).

You may want to take a look at my guidelines for writing a philosophy paper, which is posted on the Lecture Notes and Handouts website.

 

First paper:

The first paper will be due on Wednesday the 8th before class (at 2pm).

I will ask you to answer one of the following questions, but I will only tell you which one it will be on Monday the 6th (ie, two days before the due date). So please start thinking about ALL of these topics BEFORE Monday.

1. Suppose that in the 21st century there are genuinely intelligent machines. And suppose that experts in intelligence can distinguish natural and artificial intelligence because, perhaps, these intelligent machines will have certain quirks (e.g. they prefer one kind of solution to a problem with many equally good solutions, whereas most humans would prefer another). Would this show that they failed the Turing Test? Would this count as a counterexample against Turing's main claim that passing the Turing Test is a sufficient condition for thinking?

 

2. Which of the following objections to Hempel-style behaviorism is also an objection to the more sophisticated behaviorist view according to which mental states are dispositions to behave? Why?

a) Sometimes pain sufferers do not give behavioral expression to their sensation

b) One can act as if one is in pain when one is not

c) We know what pain is only on the basis of our own subjective personal experience

 

3. Suppose it were the case that we discovered aliens capable of thought and feeling and thus endowed with mental life. Suppose also that we determined that they lack brains: they do not have a life chemistry like ours and so have nothing in them like our brains. This "multiple-realizability" of mind in differing physical systems would seem to demonstrate the falsehood of which of the following philosophical theories of mind: Dualism; Behaviorism; Type identity theory, Token identity theory? Why?

 

4. What is the Chinese Room Argument supposed to show and what are the two most compelling objections against it?

 

The required length of the paper is two pages (double spaced).

You may want to take a look at my guidelines for writing a philosophy paper, which is posted on the Lecture Notes and Handouts website.